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Bug bounty programs offer a modern way for organizations to crowdsource their
software security, and for security researchers to be fairly rewarded for the vulner-
abilities they find. However, little is known on the incentives set by bug bounty
programs – how they drive engagement and new bug discoveries. This article pro-
vides an empirical investigation of the strategic interactions among the managers and
participants of bug bounty programs, as well as the intermediation by bug bounty
platforms. We find that for a given bug bounty program, each security researcher
can only expect to discover a bounded number of bugs. This result offers a valida-
tion step to a theory brought forth early on by Brady et al. [1], which proposes that
each security researcher inspecting a piece of software offers a unique environment
of skills and mindset, which is amenable to the discovery of bugs that others may
not be able to uncover. Bug bounty programs indeed benefit from the engagement
of large crowds of researchers. Conversely, security researchers benefit greatly from
searching for bugs in multiple bug bounty programs. However, we find that following
a strong front-loading effect, newly launched programs attract researchers at the ex-
2pense of older programs: the probability of finding bugs decays as ∼ 1/t0.4 after the
launch of a program, even though bugs found later yield on average higher rewards.
Our results lead us to formulate three recommendations for organizing bug bounty
programs and platforms: (i) organize enrollment, mobility and renewal of security
researchers across bounty programs, (ii) highlight and organize programs for front-
loading, and (iii) organize fluid market transactions to reduce uncertainty and thus
reduce incentives for security researchers to sell on the black market.
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3I. INTRODUCTION
On March 2nd, 2016, the Pentagon announced the launch of its first bug bounty program
[2]. From this point on, one of the most paranoid organizations in the world offered in-
centives to hackers to break into its systems and report found vulnerabilities for a reward.
Although bug bounty programs have mushroomed in the last few years, this audacious an-
nouncement by a prominent defense administration may set a precedent, if not a standard,
for the future of cybersecurity practice.
Software security has long been recognized as a challenging computational problem [3]
that often requires human intelligence. However, given the complexity of modern computer
systems, human intelligence at the individual level is no longer sufficient. Instead, orga-
nizations are turning to tap the wisdom of crowds [4] to improve their security. Software
security is not alone. Other disciplines have similarly turned to mobilizing people at scale
to tackle their hard problems, such as sorting galaxies in astronomy [5], folding proteins in
biology [6], recognizing words from low quality book scans [7], and addressing outstanding
mathematics problems [8, 9]. These examples involve different aspects of human intelli-
gence, ranging from pattern recognition (e.g., Captcha [7]) to higher abstraction levels (e.g.,
mathematical conjectures [8, 9]). It is not clear what kind of intelligence is necessary to find
bugs and vulnerabilities in software, but it generally requires a high level of programming
proficiency coupled with out-of-the-box thinking and hacking skills to find unintended uses
for a software.
From hedonist pleasure to reputation building, to activism, motivations and incentives
for hacking have evolved over time [10]. Among these, reputation and monetary incentives
are increasingly put in place to entice security researchers to hunt for bugs. Bug bounty
programs and online bug bounty platforms help set such incentives while facilitating com-
munication and transactions between security researchers and software editors [11–14]. It
however remains unclear how current mechanism designs and incentive structures will in-
fluence the long-term success of bounty programs. A better understanding of bug discovery
mechanisms [1, 15, 16], and a better characterization of the utility functions of security
researchers, organizations launching bug bounty programs and bug bounty platforms, will
4help shape the way bug bounty programs evolve in the future.
In this study, we investigate a public dataset of 35 public bug bounty programs from the
HackerOne website [17]. We find that with each vulnerability discovered within a bounty
program, the probability of finding the next vulnerability decreases more rapidly than the
corresponding increase in payoff. Therefore, security researchers rationally switch to newly
launched bounty programs at the expense of existing ones. This switching phenomenon has
already been reported in [14]. Here, we characterize it further by quantifying how incentives
evolve as more vulnerabilities get discovered in a program and how researchers benefit in the
long term by switching to newly launched programs. Our results help better understand the
mechanisms associated with bug discovery, as they provide a validation step of the theory
proposed in [1], and they help formulate concrete recommendations for the organization of
both bug bounty programs and the online platforms supporting them.
This article is organized as follows. Related research is presented in Section II. Important
features of the dataset are detailed in Section III. We introduce the main mechanism driving
vulnerability discovery in Section IV. Results are presented and discussed in Sections V and
VI, respectively. We offer concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Software reliability is an age-old problem [3, 18, 19]. Early empirical work on software
bug discovery dates back to the time of UNIX systems [20], and over the years, numerous
models for vulnerability discovery have been developed (see [16, 21] for some contemporary
approaches). As early as in 1989, it was recognized that the time to achieve a given level
of software reliability is inversely proportional to the desired failure frequency level [3]. For
example, in order to achieve a 10−9 probability of failure, a software routine should be
tested 109 times. Actually, the random variable P (T > t) = 1/t corresponds to Zipf’s law
[22, 23], which diverges as the random variable sample increases (i.e., no statistical moment
is defined). Thus, there will always be software vulnerabilities to be discovered as long as
enough resources can be provided to find them.
5Taking an evolutionary perspective brings additional insights. Finding bugs is compara-
ble to the survival process involved in the selection of species: defects are like genes, which
get expressed under the pressure of environment changes. Brady et al. [1] have shown
that software testing follows the principle of entropy maximization, which preserves genetic
variability and thus, removes only the minimum possible number of bugs, following the
exploration of use cases (i.e., the software environment). With their out-of-the-box – hacker
mindset – thinking, security researchers are precisely good at envisioning a broad range of
possible use cases, which may reveal a software defect (i.e., program crash) or an unintended
behavior.
Software solutions have been developed to systematically detect software inconsistencies
and thus potential bugs (e.g., Coverity, FindBugs, SLAM, Astree, to name a few). However,
to date, no systematic algorithmic approach has been found to detect and remove bugs
at a speed that would keep pace with software evolution and expansion. Thus, human
intelligence is still considered as one of the most efficient ways to explore novel use case
scenarios – by manual code inspection or with the help of bug testing software – in which
software may not behave in the intended way.
Management techniques and governance approaches have been developed to help software
developers and security researchers in their review tasks, starting with pair programming
[24]. To protect against cyber-criminals, it is also fashionable to hire ethical hackers – who
have a mindset similar to potential attackers – to probe the security of computer systems
[25–27]. In this context, the policy of full disclosure, originating from the hacking and open
source communities, plays a significant role in software security by forcing software owners
to acknowledge and fix vulnerabilities discovered and published by independent researchers
[28]. The full-disclosure model has evolved into responsible disclosure, a standard practice
where the security researcher agrees to allow a period of time for the vulnerability to be
patched before publishing the details of the uncovered flaw. In most of these successful
human-driven approaches, there is a knowledge-sharing component, either between two pro-
grammers sitting together in front of a screen, ethical hackers hired to probe the weaknesses
of a computer system, or the broader community being exposed to open source code and
publicly disclosed software vulnerabilities [29]. Thus, Eric Raymond’s famous quote “Given
6enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow” [30] tends to hold, even though in practice things are
often slightly more complicated [31].
One way to gather enough eyeballs is to recruit a larger crowd of security researchers.
For this purpose, bug bounty programs and vulnerability markets have emerged in recent
years to facilitate the trading of bugs and vulnerabilities. These two-sided markets provide
economic incentives to support the transfer of knowledge from security researchers to soft-
ware organizations [32], as they help simultaneously to harness the wisdom of crowds and
to reveal the security level of organizations through a competitive incentive mechanism [33].
Nonetheless, the efficiency of bug bounty programs has been questioned on both theoretical
[34, 35] and empirical grounds [36, 37].
Building on previous work by Schechter [33], Ozment [38] theorized that the most effi-
cient mechanisms are not markets per se, but rather auction systems [39]. In a nutshell,
the proposed (monopsonistic) auction mechanism implies an initial reward R(t = t0) = R0,
which increases linearly with time. If a bug is reported more than once, only the first re-
porter receives the reward. Therefore, security researchers have an incentive to submit a
vulnerability early (before other researchers submit the same bug), but not too early, so that
they can maximize their payoff R(t) = R0 + ǫ× t with ǫ the linear growth factor, which is
meant to compensate for the increasing difficulty of finding each new bug. However, setting
the right incentive structure {R0, ǫ} is non-trivial given uncertainties in the amount of work
needed, the level of competition (e.g., the number of researchers enrolled) in the bug bounty
program [40], or the nature and likelihood of overlap between two submissions by different
researchers. Nevertheless, bug bounty programs have emerged as a tool used by many soft-
ware organizations, with a range of heterogeneous incentive schemes [12]. For instance, some
bug bounty programs include no monetary rewards [13]. Meanwhile, dedicated platforms
have been launched to act as trusted third parties in charge of clearing transactions between
organizations and security researchers. These platforms also assist organizations in the de-
sign and deployment of their own program. One of the leading platforms is HackerOne,
which runs public and private programs for organizations across a wide range of business
sectors. A subset of the private and public programs award bounties, while other bug bounty
programs capitalize on incentives associated with reputation building, which is an important
7motivation driver in the hacker community [41]. These programs report bounty awards on
their company program pages on the HackerOne website. Previous research has investi-
gated vulnerability trends, response and resolve behaviors, as well as reward structures of
participating organizations [13, 14]. In particular, it was found that a considerable number
of organizations experienced diminishing trends for the number of reported vulnerabilities,
even as the monetary incentives exhibit a significantly positive correlation with the number
of vulnerabilities reported [14]. Recent research has also proposed approaches to improve
the overall effectiveness of bug bounty programs and platforms by reducing the number of
low-quality submissions, and by tackling the problem of duplicate submissions via novel
incentive and allocation mechanisms, respectively [42–44].
III. DATA
The data were collected from the public part of the HackerOne website. From 35 public
bounty programs, we collected the rewards received by security researchers (in US dollars),
with their timestamps (45 other public bounty programs do not disclose detailed information
on rewards, and the number of private programs is not disclosed). Since HackerOne started
its platform in December 2013, new public programs have been launched roughly every
two months, following an essentially memoryless Poisson process (λ = 57 days, p < 0.001
and R2 > 0.99). Figure 1A shows the timeline of the 9 most active programs with at
least 90 valid (i.e., rewarded) bug discoveries, as of February 15th, 2016. When a new
program is launched, we observe an initial peak within weeks after launch, which accounts
for the majority of discoveries. After the initial surge of vulnerability discoveries, bounty
awards become less frequent following a robust power law decay ∼ tα with α = −0.40(4)
(p < 0.001 and R2 = 0.79; the fit of the time series was obtained using ordinary least square
regression as described in [45]) at the aggregate level and over all 35 bounty programs
(see Figure 1B). Some programs depart from this averaged trend: For instance, Twitter
exhibits a steady, almost constant, bug discovery rate and VKontakte exhibits its peak
activity months after the initial launch. These peculiar behaviors may be attributed to
program tuning and marketing, to sudden change of media exposure or even to fundamen-
tal differences of program comparative fitness, for which we do not have specific information.
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FIG. 1. A.Weekly vulnerability discoveries for the 9 most active programs (with at least 90 bug discoveries
as of February 15, 2016). The light colored vertical bars represent the start of the program, occurring when
the first bounty is awarded. Most programs exhibit an initial shock, followed by a decay of discoveries, which
is characterized at the aggregate level by a long-memory process (panel B) characterized by a power law
decay ∼ tα with α = −0.40(4) (p < 0.001 and R2 = 0.79, obtained by ordinary least square fitting). Each
data point in the figure is the median of normalized vulnerability numbers of all 35 programs considered in
this study.
The power law decay observed here is reminiscent of the long-established ∼ 1/τ law of
bug discovery in software testing [3]. This similitude is interesting even though bug bounty
programs do not provide direct information regarding software reliability. The difference
of exponent (α ≈ 0.4 instead of 1), may stem from long-memory processes associated with
human behaviors and human timing effects, which correspond to task priority queueing
and a rationale use of time as non-storable scarce resource [45]. Long-memory processes
observed in collective human behaviors such as those observed on Figure 1B may also be
associated with critical cascades of productive events [46]. The intuition is that each security
researcher will generate a cascade of bug discoveries (of a size related to the total number of
9bugs discovered by this person, which is a random variable across all researchers), and by
her activity (each researcher will influence and attract other researchers), hence generating
cascades of joining and of bug discoveries.
Here, we do not consider the human timing effects encompassing delays, effort, processing
time, and influence. We only consider incremental valid bug discovery and reporting by
security researchers.
IV. METHOD
Bug bounty programs work on the premise that humans as a crowd are efficient at search-
ing and finding bugs. Their mere existence is a de facto recognition that market approaches
for bug discovery bring efficiency, beyond in-house security. Bug bounty programs signal
that organizations are ready to complement their vertical cost-effective security operations
with market approaches, which are traditionally perceived as less cost-effective, yet more
adaptive [47]. Early on, Brady et al. [1] have offered a hint for the existence of such markets
for bugs: according to their proposed theory, each researcher has slightly different skills
and mindset. When a security researcher tests a software piece by choosing the inputs, she
offers a unique operational environment. This environment is prone to the discovery of new
bugs, which may not have been seen by other researchers. The proposed theory by Brady
et al. [1] intrinsically justifies the existence of bug bounty program structures as markets,
which provide the necessary diversity to account for the highly uncertain risk horizon of
bug discovery. Here, we develop a quantitative method to formalize a mechanism and to
test the theory proposed in [1]. This validation step shall help provide organizational design
insights for bug bounty programs.
For that, we investigate the interplay between the vulnerability discovery process and the
cumulative rewards distributed to security researchers within and across 35 public bounty
programs hosted on HackerOne. When a bug bounty program starts, it attracts a number
of security researchers, who in turn submit bug reports. Subsequent bug discoveries get
increasingly difficult for each individual researcher, and to some extent for all researchers
together. The difficulties faced by security researchers can be technical. They can also
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be the result of insufficient or conflicting incentives. Here, we develop and test a model,
which accounts for both technical difficulties and insufficient incentives. We further address
conflicting incentives by measuring the effect of newly launched bug bounty programs on
incumbent programs.
Starting from an initial probability of discovering the first vulnerability P (k = 0) = 1,
the probability to find a second bug is a fraction of the former probability: Pk+1 = β · Pk
with β a constant strictly smaller than one. The probability that no more discoveries will
be made after k steps is given by Pk = β
k(1 − β). Conversely, starting from the initial
reward R0 = R(k = 0), the subsequent reward R1 = Λ1 · R0, and further additional reward
R2 = Λ2Λ1 · R0. After n steps, the total reward is the sum of all past rewards:
Rn = R0
n∑
k=1
Λ1...Λk. (1)
Thus, Rn is the recurrence solution of the Kesten map (Rn = ΛnRn−1 + R0) [48, 49]:
as soon as amplification occurs (technically, some of the factors Λk are larger than 1),
the distribution of rewards is a power law, whose exponent µ is a function of β and of
the distribution of the factors Λk. In the case where all factors are equal to Λ, this model
predicts three possible regimes for the distribution of rewards (for a given program): thinner
than exponential for Λ < 1, exponential for Λ = 1, and power law for Λ > 1 with exponent
µ = | lnβ|/ lnΛ [50]. The expected payoff of vulnerability discovery is given by,
Uk = Pk ×Rk, (2)
with both Pk and Rk random variables respectively determined by β and Λ. Because Uk is
a multiplication of diverging probability and reward components, its nature is reminiscent
of the St. Petersburg paradox (or St. Petersburg lottery), proposed first by the Swiss
Mathematician Nicolas Bernoulli in 1713, and later formalized by his brother Daniel in 1738
[51]. The St. Petersburg paradox states the problem of decision-making when both the
probability and the reward are diverging for k → ∞: a player has a chance to toss a fair
coin at each stage of the game. The pot starts at two and is doubled every time a head
appears. The first time a tail appears, the game ends and the player wins whatever is in
the pot. Thus, the player wins two if a tail appears on the first toss, four if a head appears
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on the first toss and a tail on the second, eight if a head appears on the first two tosses
and a tail on the third, and so on. The main interest of Bernoulli was to determine how
much a player would be ready to pay for this game, and he found that very few people
would like to play this game even though the expected utility increases (in the simplest
case proposed by Bernoulli, Un =
∑n
k=0 Uk = n) [51]. The situation of a security researcher
differs from the St. Petersburg lottery as bug search costs are incurred at every step. Since
these costs influence the probability to find an additional bug, they can be at least partially
integrated in Pk. We could assume equivalently that costs are integrated into a net utility as
U∗k = Uk−ck. Here, we do not factor these costs in because their exact nature is largely unde-
termined and our data do not offer a reliable proxy. The security researcher may also decide
to stop searching for bugs in a program, at any time k: this is equivalent to setting Pk+1 = 0.
The expected payoff Uk therefore determines the incentive structure for security re-
searchers, given that the bounty program manager can tune R0 and to some extent Λ. The
utility function may also incorporate non-monetary incentives, such as reputation: finding
a long series of bugs may signal some fitness for a bug bounty program and thus create
a permanent job opportunity [52]. Similarly, discovery of a rare (resp. critical) bug that
no other researcher has found before has a strong signaling effect, which can help make a
career. However, these strategies are high-risk high-return. Therefore, they result in addi-
tional fame. In the next section, we will calibrate our model to the bug discovery process
associated with 35 bounty programs publicly documented on the HackerOne platform.
V. RESULTS
The discovery process in a bug bounty program is driven by the probability to find an
additional bug given that k bugs have already been discovered. Program managers aim to
maximize the total number of bugs found Bc. Our results show that the number of bugs
discovered is a super-linear function of security researchers who have enrolled in the program
(see Figure 2A). While bug bounty programs benefit from the work of a large number of
researchers, researchers overall benefit from diversifying their efforts across programs (see
Figure 3C). This benefit is particularly tangible regarding the cumulative reward they can
extract from their bug hunting activity. In particular, we illustrate how researchers take
12
the strategic decision to enroll in a newly launched program, at the expense of existing ones
they have formerly been involved in.
A. Security researcher enrollment determines the success of a bug bounty program
As captured in Figure 2A, we find that the number Bc of bugs discovered in a bug bounty
program scales as Bc ∼ h
α with α = 1.10(3) and h the number of security researchers en-
rolled in a program. Since α > 1, a bounty program benefits in a super-linear fashion from
the enrollment of more researchers. This result is reminiscent of productive bursts and
critical cascades of contributions in open source software development [46]: each enrollment
(i.e., mother event) initiates a cascade of bug discoveries (i.e., daughter events). Here each
cascade stems from a single security researcher and the nature of these cascades is captured
at the aggregate level by their size as a random variable. As shown on Figure 2B, the
distribution of bounty discoveries per researcher and per program follows a power law tail
P (X > x) ∼ 1/xγ with γ = 1.63(7). The first moment of the distribution (i.e., the mean)
is however well-defined (as a result of γ > 1). Moreover, we observe an upper cut-off of the
tail with xmax ≈ 40 bounties. Thus, each enrollment of a security researcher in a program
provides a statistically bounded amount of new bug discoveries.
B. Security researchers are incentivized to diversify their contributions across bug
bounty programs
For security researchers, the main metric is the expected cumulative payoff earned from
the accumulation of bounty awards over all programs. This expected payoff is governed by
the probability to find a given number of bugs and their associated payoffs, as discussed
in Section IV. To fully understand the incentive mechanisms at work, we consider three
perspectives: (i) the expected cumulative down-payment made by bug bounty program
managers (see Figure 3A), the expected cumulative payoff from the viewpoint of a secu-
rity researcher for (ii) one program (see Figure 3B), and for (iii) all programs (see Figure 3C).
The average cumulative down-payment per program exhibits a super-linear scaling as
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FIG. 2. A. The number of bounty discoveries per program Bc scales as hα with α = 1.10(3) and h the
number of security researchers enrolled in a program (fit and confidence interval were obtained by ordinary
least squares of the logarithm of researcher and bounty counts). Since α > 1, a bounty program benefits in
a super-linear fashion to the enrollment of more researchers. B. The tail distribution of bounty discoveries
per researcher per program follows a power law distribution P (X > x) ∼ 1/xγ with 1 < γ = 1.63(7) < 2
(obtained by maximum likelihood estimation and confidence interval bootstrapping, following [22, 53]). The
distribution is therefore relatively well bounded (with the first moment being well-defined). Furthermore,
we observe an upper cut-off of the tail with xmax ≈ 400 bounties. Thus, from A. and B. combined, we find
that the number of vulnerabilities is mainly driven by the number of researchers enrolled in programs.
∼ k1.27 (p < 0.001, R2 > 0.99), while the frequency of bugs Pk is only slightly upwards
trended, increasing as ∼ k0.13 (p < 0.001, R2 = 0.40). The expected down-payment by bug
bounty program managers therefore scales as ∼ k1.40. This is a considerable super-linear
increase (as k → ∞), which casts questions on the long-term sustainability of bug bounty
programs.
From the security researcher’s viewpoint and her expected payoff from a single bug
bounty program, the increase of average cumulative reward (Rk ∼ k
1.40) does not offset the
fast decay of probability (Pk ∼ k
−1.85) to find a vulnerability of rank k. The expected payoff
therefore follows Uk ∼ k
−0.45, which does not bring high incentives to explore in depth a
bug bounty program. However, it is important to note that the bug bounty manager cannot
directly fix Pk, which can only be influenced – to some extent – by increasing rewards. To
maintain positive individual incentives, the manager should set an incremental reward such
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FIG. 3. A. (Log-)binned cumulative down-payment per program over all public programs on the HackerOne
platform, scales as Rk ∼ k
1.27 with k the rank (p < 0.001, R2 > 0.99; fit obtained with ordinary least squares
of the logarithmic values on both axis). Each log-bin shows the mean value and the circle sizes depict the
number of values in each bin (i.e., the rank frequency). The super-linear scaling relationship between the
cumulative reward and the rank shows that reward increases as a function of k. However, the frequency
of vulnerabilities Pk is only slightly upwards trended increasing as ∼ k
0.13 (p < 0.001, R2 = 0.40). B.
Considering the security researcher’s expected payoff for one bug bounty program, the super-linear effect is
much stronger (Rk ∼ k
1.40 with p < 0.001 and R2 > 0.99). However, the frequency decays following a power
law of the form Pk ∼ k
−1.85 (p < 0.001, R2 = 0.97). C. Over all bug bounty programs, security researchers
have another expected payoff: the reward scaling is smaller (Rk ∼ k
1.24 with p < 0.001, R2 > 0.99), yet the
frequency of bug discoveries decays much slower as a function of rank Pk ∼ k
−1.05 (p < 0.001, R2 = 0.85).
that Rk ∼ k
α with α > 1.40, which in turn would worsen the down-payment function both
in terms of incremental expenditures and in exploration of bugs with higher ranks. This
approach does not consider possible individual human hard limits preventing the finding of
additional bugs, which would drive iterative costs ck sufficiently high as k gets large. In
that latter case, setting higher reward incentives would have no effect.
Security researchers tend to switch from one bounty program to another program [13, 14].
The strategy can be interpreted as portfolio diversification [54]. Over all bug bounty pro-
grams, security researchers have another much more favorable expected payoff: the reward
scaling is smaller (Rk ∼ k
1.24 with p < 0.001, R2 > 0.99), yet the frequency of bug discoveries
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decays much slower as a function of rank Pk ∼ k
−1.05 (p < 0.001, R2 = 0.85). Therefore, over
all bounty programs, security researchers have an increasing – yet marginally decreasing –
incentive to explore higher ranks as Uk ∼ k
0.19. In a nutshell, security researchers have an
incentive to keep searching for bugs on a large variety of bug bounty programs.
C. Influence of newly launched programs on researcher behaviors
As security researchers weigh their strategic choice to switch their attention from one pro-
gram to another, the time factor is determinant because the expected payoff is dependent
on the current vulnerability rank, which maps into the time dimension (i.e, the duration
between two discoveries is drawn from a characteristic random variable, which is not consid-
ered here). While a researcher may decide to switch at any time, the most obvious moment
is when a new program is being launched: incentives shift suddenly and security researchers
may decide to leave older programs at the expense of new programs with fresh bug discovery
opportunities. However, a number of factors may influence their decision: the reputation of
the organization launching the new program (it brings more recognition to submit a bug to
e.g., Twitter compared to a less well-known organization), the amount of reward, and the
relative time between an old program and the newest one. To encompass the effects of new
public bug bounty programs on incumbent programs, we aim to test three hypotheses:
• H1: An existing bounty program will receive fewer reports when more new programs
are launched,
• H2: An existing bounty program will receive less reports when bounty rewards pro-
vided by newly launched programs are higher,
• H3: The number of newly launched programs has a negative impact on the contribu-
tion to older programs.
We specify a simple ordinary least square (OLS) regression model as follows:
Vit = β0 + β1dPt + β2Tit + β3Ait + β4Bit + ǫit. (3)
Vit is the number of vulnerability reports received by bounty program i in the month t.
dPt is the number of new programs launched in month t. Hypothesis H1 predicts that its
16
coefficient (β1) is negative. Tit is the number of months since bounty program i launched.
We consider two control variables that could influence a researcher’s decision [14]. We first
incorporate Ai the log of the Alexa rank, which measures web traffic as a proxy of popularity
for organization i. Bi is the log of the average amount of bounty paid per bug by bounty
program i. Both Ai and Bi are assumed to remain constant over time. Finally, ǫit is the
unobservable error term. In models 2-4, we extend the basic model (model 1) to further
study competition occurring between bounty programs. These alternative specifications
include:
• Average bounty of newly launched programs: intuitively, if new programs offer
higher rewards, they should attract more researchers from existing programs. We
calculate the average bounty for all new programs in month t as NBt in models 2-4.
• Interaction between dPt and Tit: conceivably, the effect of new programs on existing
programs depends on certain characteristics of the latter, such as age. In particular, we
ask if a new entrant has more negative effects on older programs compared to younger
programs? To examine this, we consider an interaction term between the number of
new programs (dPt) and the age of the program (Tit) in models 3-4. Hypothesis H3
predicts that this coefficient should be negative.
• Program fixed effect: to better control for program-specific, time-invariant char-
acteristics, e.g., the reputation among researchers, we add a program fixed effect in
model 4. The addition of this fixed effect allows us to examine how bug discovery
changes over time within each program i.
The regression results are shown in Table I. Consistent with hypothesis H1, the coefficient
of dPt is negative and statistically significant in all four specifications. Ceteris paribus,
the launch of new programs reduces the number of vulnerabilities reported to existing pro-
grams. In other words, the entry of new programs indeed attracts researchers’ attention
away from existing programs, which is consistent with the fast decreasing expected payoff
for individuals searching bugs for a specific program. Also, the average bounty paid by new
programs (Bnew,t) has a negative effect on existing programs as well, but the coefficient is
only significant in model 4. Again this result is consistent with the theory and hypothesis
H2, as researchers have a higher incentive to switch to new programs, if they offer more
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TABLE I. Regression results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Vit Vit Vit Vit
dPt -1.235*** -1.350*** -2.310*** -1.236**
(0.305) (0.327) (0.603) (0.515)
Ai -23.61*** -23.72*** -23.72*** -7.188**
(2.140) (2.156) (2.152) (3.473)
Bi 16.64*** 16.56*** 16.75*** -7.414
(1.311) (1.315) (1.339) (5.698)
Tit -0.690 -0.658 -3.312*** -3.758***
(0.426) (0.427) (1.239) (1.128)
Bnew,t -0.0445 -0.0312 -0.0321*
(0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0184)
Tit × dPt 0.106** 0.0755*
(0.0431) (0.0406)
Constant 160.2*** 170.4*** 190.3*** 136.5***
(16.12) (18.80) (23.17) (26.17)
Observations 1,212 1,212 1,212 1,212
R-squared 0.314 0.316 0.319 0.647
Program FE No No No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
low-hanging fruits and higher bounties.
The interaction coefficients for term Tit×dPt in models 3 and 4 are positive and statisti-
cally significant, so they do not support hypothesis H3. The result shows that the impact of
newly launched programs depends on the age of the existing programs: compared to younger
programs, the negative impact of dPt is smaller for programs with a longer history, i.e., those
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with larger Tit. At first sight, this results may look at odds with the fact that individual
expected payoff from a specific program decreases as a function of rank k, and presumably
the older a program the more likely it has a high rank. Thus, the switching effect should
be stronger. Perhaps our OLS regression model is limited in the sense that it does account
for the absolute activity (which decreases very slowly as t → ∞, as shown on Figure 1B),
instead of the variation rate. Consistent with previous research [14], the regression results
also show that a program with higher reputation (Ai) or higher bounty (Bi) is associated
with more bugs received in a month. The regression results also show that a program with
higher age (Tit) is associated with less bugs found. This observation corresponds to the
power law decay of bug submission observed following a program launch (c.f., Figure 1B).
VI. DISCUSSION
Finding bugs in software code is one of the oldest and toughest problems in software
engineering [3]. While algorithm-based approaches have been developed [21], human verifi-
cation has remained a prime way for bug hunting. Resorting to the crowd for finding bugs
is not new [55], but bug bounty programs have recently been promoted by the emergence
of bug bounty platforms. Here, we have studied the incentive mechanisms across 35 bug
bounty programs on HackerOne. Our results show that the number of discovered bugs
and vulnerabilities in a bounty program is super-linearly associated with the number of
security researchers. However, the distribution of bugs found per researcher per program
is bounded: in a given bug bounty program, the marginal probability of finding additional
bugs is decreasing rapidly. On the contrary, security researchers have high incentives to
switch among multiple bug bounty programs. We find indeed that each newly launched
program has a negative effect on submissions to incumbent bug bounty programs. Further-
more, controlling specifically for monetary incentives, we find that the amount of reward
for valid bugs in newly launched programs has a negative effect on the number of bug
submissions to incumbent programs. These results provide important insights on the theory
of bug discovery. They also help draw practical organization design recommendations for
bug bounty platforms such as HackerOne, as well as for organizations managing bug bounty
programs.
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Our results provide an essential validation step to the theory formulated by Brady et al.
[1]. No single security researcher is able to find most bugs in one program. In contrast, a
good bug bounty program involves submissions from a diverse crowd of security researchers.
Borrowing to the formulation by Brady et al. of software security as a phenomenon of evo-
lutionary pressure dictated by environmental changes, we shall propose that any additional
security researcher involved in a bug bounty program brings a unique combination of skills
and mindset. This unique perspective is comparable to a slightly changing environment
for the software piece under scrutiny, and is associated with unique opportunities for each
security researcher, regardless of the opportunity level of other researchers focused on the
same software piece. Yet, because people cannot easily change their skills and mindset, once
the opportunity has been exploited, finding additional bugs gets much harder. Therefore,
researchers tend to turn their attention to newly launched bug bounty programs.
The fact that each security researcher has a limited capacity to uncover a large number of
bugs for a specific program (i.e., on a specific piece of software) carries a strong justification
for the existence of bug bounty programs as a tool for engaging a large and diverse crowd of
security researchers, beyond internalized software testing and security research teams. As
a concrete case, we discuss the Uber bug bounty program launched in 2016 [52]. Uber has
designed its program as a way to select and hire a band of security czars from a larger crowd.
Although there is certainly nothing wrong with hiring security experts in an opportunistic
manner, our results rather suggest that systematically using bug bounty programs for hiring
may prove counter-productive in the long term. Security researchers will be likely to tune
their expectations and behaviors toward getting a job. The approach implemented by Uber
may reduce engagement by researchers who do not expect to get a job offer. Thus, it could
limit the involvement of a larger crowd and its renewal as more permanent security positions
get filled.
The strategy followed by Uber for its bug bounty program is also interesting from a
theoretical perspective: Uber is following a well-known strategy first described by Ronald
Coase [47], which prescribes that if an organization has repeated interactions on the market
with the same counterpart – or ceteris paribus a similar counterpart – then the organization
is better off internalizing the resource in order to avoid repeated transaction costs. Hence
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Uber considers security researchers as substitute goods, while our results – and probably
the mere existence of bug bounty programs – rather demonstrate that security researchers
are complements. The distinction between substitutes and complements regarding security
researchers brings a fundamental justification for the existence and the future development
of bug bounty programs as marketplaces for trading bugs and vulnerabilities [11].
Yet, the organization designs of bug bounties programs and the online platforms sup-
porting them are still pretty much empirical. The validation step performed here provides
additional theoretical insights. On the one hand, these insights shall be useful to formulate
recommendations. On the other hand, they help identify blind spots, which will deserve
future theoretical and empirical research efforts. We propose three major recommenda-
tions that may significantly improve the efficiency of bug bounty programs and the online
platforms hosting them, as well as help maximize the engagement of security researchers.
A. Encourage enrollment, mobility and renewal
Bug bounty programs shall encourage mobility by devoting resources to the recruitment of
security researchers who were not previously involved in the program, rather than increasing
efforts to keep security researchers who have already performed well. Mobility increases
chances to find security researchers with diverse skills and mindset, who in turn will find
additional bugs. Similarly, bug bounty platforms have the possibility to encourage mobility
across bug bounty programs. We have found that mobility across programs already exists,
in particular mobility from old to newly launched programs. We also advocate the active
recruitment of new security researchers by both bug bounty programs and platforms. For
example, a bug bounty platform may highlight older programs to security researchers who
have recently enrolled on the platform.
B. Feature major changes for front-loading
The launch of a new bug bounty program is a unique moment, which can attract a large
number of security researchers. Yet front-loading may also be organized when a software
piece receives a major update with higher probability of finding bugs. For instance, when
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a new software release contains significant changes in the codebase, bug bounty program
managers should feature these changes and help security researchers focus on issues they have
not previously been exposed to. This approach may also help bug bounty program managers
steer the attention of security researchers toward more pressing security issues. Front-loading
can also be organized with a temporary increase of bug bounty rewards. Additionally,
dynamic adaptation of incentives can help manage contingencies associated with surges
of submissions. For instance, bug bounty managers may decide to reduce rewards during
internal overload periods.
C. Organize fluid and low-transaction cost markets
One overarching concern with trading bugs and vulnerabilities is the temptation by se-
curity researchers to consider selling their bugs on the black market. One way to alleviate
this problem is to streamline transactions costs associated with bug submission and reward
operations. Encouraging mobility without providing market fluidity indeed exposes to the
risk that bugs get sold more often on the black market. Our recommendation is reminiscent
of the strategy followed by Apple: by offering cheap enough and easy to download online
music, Apple managed to capture most of the online music black market, such as Napster.
Bug bounty programs face similar challenges and opportunities to capture a larger market
share by reducing transaction costs and thus offering an alternative to uncertainties associ-
ated with the black market.
Our recommendations stem directly from the validation step we performed. They show
the importance of having a clear view of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the
mechanisms of bug bounty programs and of platforms organizing them. Mobility, front-
loading and market fluidity may be organized either through top-down bureaucracy or by
setting market incentives appropriately. The relative advantages of bureaucracy and market
organization shall be further studied. Our recommendations for designing bug bounty pro-
grams apply indiscriminately to public and private bug bounties. However, we believe that
private bug bounty programs face more complex challenges as they select their invited par-
ticipants. The selection process is costly and de facto reduces the pool of security researchers.
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Our study would benefit from additional empirical research using data which are cur-
rently not available from public sources. First, our results are limited by the difficulty to
estimate the resource costs that security researchers bear when searching for bugs (e.g.,
time spent). This information would help further test and understand our results, which
show that there are physical limitations regarding the possibility for an individual to find
an arbitrarily large number of bugs. Information on the cost functions would also bring
further insights on refined expected utility functions by security researchers, in particular,
the distinction between expected monetary rewards and effort devoted to reputation seeking.
We may also further question how bug bounty program operations impact the motiva-
tion of researchers: for example, bug bounty programs may be temporarily overloaded with
submissions [13, 14]. This overload may stem from priority queueing [45] and effort required
to verify and remediate security incidents internally [56]. Delays and contingencies, such
as timing and discounting effects, contribute to increase transaction costs and uncertainties
for security researchers. Deeper understanding of the dynamics associated with bug bounty
program operations may help establish a benchmark on the performance of organization
designs and their implementations.
Finally, there is evidence that security researchers have specialized knowledge and skills.
The competitive environment associated with bug bounty programs reinforces incentives
to specialize. At least two types of specialization exist in bug bounty programs: program-
specific and vulnerability-specific [13, 14]. Program-specific specialization is associated with
knowledge, experience and skills required to find vulnerabilities in websites and software
products in one particular bug bounty program. Since specialization is relatively unique
to the program, a specialized researcher has fewer options to switch between programs.
Vulnerability-specific specialization is associated with knowledge and skills regarding a par-
ticular type of vulnerability, which can exist in many different products. These researchers
have stronger incentives to explore different bug bounty programs. Specialization must be
accounted for when implementing organization design recommendations. In some circum-
stances, it may be desirable to attract a crowd of diverse yet specialized security researchers.
Depending on the specialization required, targeting specific security researchers may how-
ever restrict the diversity of the resource pool. Specialization is directly associated with the
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concept of skills and mindset, which we have introduced here to explain the observed hard
limits regarding the number of bugs a single researcher can find. This notion deserves a
more thorough definition as well as a testable theory.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated how crowds of security researchers hunt software vul-
nerabilities and how they report their findings to bug bounty programs on dedicated online
platforms. Consistent with the famous adage “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”
by Eric Raymond [30], we have found that security researchers face challenging difficulties
when trying to uncover large numbers of bugs in the same bounty program: the super-linear
reward increase for newly discovered bugs does not counterbalance the sharply decreasing
probability of finding new bugs by the same person. This result is consistent with the the-
ory proposed by Brady et al. on maximized entropy of bug discovery as an evolutionary
process, following adaptation to changing environments [1]: each security researcher tests
software within an environment bounded by her skills and mindset. This result brings a
fundamental justification for the existence of markets for bugs, beyond internalized security
operations and research: bug bounty programs offer a way to capitalize on these diverse
environments provided by the involvement of many security researchers. Yet, difficulties for
researchers to find large numbers of bugs in one bug bounty program bring incentives for
mobility across programs. In particular, we find that the launch of new bug bounty programs
has a negative effect on incumbent programs regarding bug submissions. We thus propose
three organization design recommendations. First, enrollment, mobility and renewal shall
be encouraged across bug bounty programs as well as across bug bounty platforms. Sec-
ond, bug bounty program managers shall highlight major changes in the codebase and get
organized for front-loading, in order to help security researchers focus on recent codebase
changes. Finally, recognizing that market structures are a powerful mechanism to mobilize
large crowds of security researchers, we recommend to organize fluid market transactions,
in order to reduce as much as possible uncertainties associated with bug submissions.
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